Sources from Óscar Puente's department confirmed that 112 failed to provide precise data on the Alvia's location, unlike the information provided for the Iryo train. This revelation comes from a preliminary report by the Guardia Civil, dated March 28, which analyzes the actions of emergency services during the incident.
The police document highlights a "significant initial confusion" caused by the high volume of emergency calls, which were mistakenly associated with the Iryo train accident. This situation reportedly led to a considerable delay in deploying emergency personnel to the site of the Alvia 2384, which was carrying dozens of passengers requiring urgent medical assistance after the collision.
There was a "significant initial confusion" due to the volume of emergency calls received, and all of them "were confused as being related to the Iryo train accident.
According to Ministry of Transport sources, 112 Andalucía knew the severity and location of the Iryo train one minute after the collision, at 19:44:51. However, just fifteen seconds later, the emergency service received information about seriously injured individuals on a different convoy, without immediately verifying if these were indeed two separate train incidents or duplicate information about the same event.
Óscar Puente's department emphasizes that AML (Advanced Mobile Location) technology allows mobile phones to automatically send their exact location to 112. Therefore, they argue that it was possible at that time to precisely determine that two trains had crashed in different locations, which would have enabled a more effective and coordinated emergency response.
The same ministerial sources indicate that there was communication between the control room managers of 112 Madrid and Andalucía, who "concluded that the involvement of two trains could be a confusion, without verifying the location of those calls." This decision, made in the critical moments after the accident, was reportedly decisive in preventing the immediate activation of two independent rescue operations, one for each affected convoy.
The ADIF Protection and Security Center (CPS) in Madrid was the one that subsequently informed 112 about the involvement of the Alvia 2384, reporting an emergency brake and injured passengers on board. The Ministry of Transport considers this delay in communication difficult to understand and questions why the operational commanders did not order the immediate location of both trains using available technological means.
The Guardia Civil report was based on an exhaustive analysis of recordings from various emergency operators, including 112 Andalucía and Madrid, ADIF's CPS in Seville and Madrid, the Atocha Regulation and Circulation Center (CRC), and the Guardia Civil's Operational Services Center (COS) in Córdoba. This cross-analysis of communications corroborated the "significant initial confusion" that affected assistance to Alvia passengers.
Ongoing investigations will need to determine if the delay in assisting the Alvia had a direct impact on the clinical outcome of those affected, a complex aspect to evaluate medico-legally, but crucial given that the first minutes after an accident are fundamental for patient prognosis.
